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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to assess the efficacy of the prospective reforms proposed by the Basel Committee 
on emerging market economies. Egypt and Ukraine are selected as comparative case studies representing 
middle-income developing nations and transition economies that have shown diverse reactions to the global 
crisis. Using a small-scale DSGE model, the projected changes to capital adequacy measures, minimum 
liquidity requirements and Corporate Governance are tested on a set of macroeconomic outputs: GDP growth, 
employment, inflation and interest rates over the period of 2000:01-2010:03. The results reveal that the 
DSGE model is an inaccurate forecasting tool for both nations. Also, the impacts of the proposed regulatory 
reforms are quite detrimental for Ukraine, but better weathered by the Egyptian economy, implying that 
emerging nations that were well geared up through meeting requirements of Basel II will show more 
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Introduction  
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) and the ensuing 
economic turmoil erupted with waves of bewilderment on 
part of the global community and the supervisory 
authorities. The dejection was motivated by the 
uncovering of the delusion that the Basel Accord II, 
which was born to the collective international action of 
central bankers, has harmonized international banking 
practices and eliminated unconditional bank competition.  
Yet, it is unwarranted to primarily blame the current 
commotion on deregulation. Whilst a few heavily 
regulated emerging market economies (EMEs) were 
shielded from the financial turmoil many others were not 
spared its callous blow. The inefficacy of Basel Accord II 
to safeguard banking sectors in many nations has tempted 
monetary regulators round the world to introduce copious 
reforms. In response to the GFC, an international 
integrated collaboration between central bankers and top 
supervisors on the key calibrations of a package of 
banking reforms emerged throughout 2009-10. The Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) engaged 
scores of bankers, academics and regulators and invited 
their comments on a set of consultative documents to 
augment the June 2006 accord. The impending regulatory 
framework is dubbed Basel III.  
The most serious banking problems emanate from 
lax credit standards and reckless portfolio risk 
management, which may inherently lead to the eruption 
of the so-called “twin crises” engulfing a financial 
calamity and an economic downturn (Mishkin, 1994). For 
this reason, the Basel Committee initiated amendments, 
the most important being the introduction of new 
measures of capital adequacy, liquidity and leverage 
requirements and requisites for corporate governance. 
However, due to the vast disparity in the levels of skills 
and governance among emerging market regulators the 
final outcome is expected to vary from one economy to 
the other (Calomiris and Powell, 2000).   
The main motivation of the study is to draw a 
comparison of the macroeconomic impacts of the 
prospected Basel III reforms on EMEs. Egypt and 
Ukraine are chosen as representative case studies of a 
middle-income developing nation and transition 
economies, respectively. Figure (1) shows that while 
Egypt adequately weathered the crisis, the Ukrainian 
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economy has shown signs of severe recession in 2009 
and its banks are suffering from large losses. The paper is 
organized such that section (2) delves into 
macroeconomic developments and the evolution of 
corporate governance in both nations. Section (3) throws 
light on the impending Basel III and sections (4) and (5) 
construct the DSGE model. Sections (6) and (7) draw 
forecasts and policy simulations. Finally, policy 
implications for both Egypt and Ukraine are outlined. 
 
Sources: Databases of Central Bank of Egypt and National Bank of Ukraine. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of GDP Growth and Return on Equity (ROE) in Egypt & Ukraine 
 
Macroeconomic, Regulatory and Corporate 
Governance Developments    
 
In view of the substantial episodes of financial crises and 
bank failures since the turn of the century, serious 
attempts were undertaken by central banks of most 
transition and emerging economies to impose stringent 
capital adequacy requirements and consolidate the 
banking sector (Henry, 2009). However, the National 
Bank of Ukraine (NBU) failed to reduce the number of 
banks, which increased from 181 banks in 2005 to 194 as 
at August 2010 (NBU, 2010). On the other hand, the 
Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) forced banks into voluntary 
and involuntary mergers and acquisitions, hence reducing 
the number of Egyptian banks from 82 in 1991to 39 in 
2010. However, unlike the 19% foreign ownership in the 
Egyptian banking sector (EIU, 2009), it reached 45% in 
Ukraine in 2010 (NBU, 2010). While foreign ownership 
transfers banking knowhow and grants domestic branches 
access to ample liquidity from their foreign subsidiaries, 
it exposes the banking system to foreign shocks and 
crises (Mody and Taylor, 2007).  
 
2.1 Regulatory Controls in Response to the GFC 
 
The first step undertaken by the NBU in the way of 
taming the crisis was a moratorium on the withdrawal of 
deposits by individuals1. Although breaching depositors’ 
rights and jeopardizing future national savings, this 
decree provided a short-term solution to reduce deposit 
runs. Shortly afterwards, Ukrainian regulators raised the 
cap of deposit insurance to the equivalent of USD 28,000. 
                                                   
1
 This is in accordance with the Decree of the Board of the National 
Bank of Ukraine № 319, dated 11.10.2008, which also restricted the 
foreign currency loans to counterparts who do not generate income in 
foreign currency. 
Additionally, towards the end of 2008, both the 
government and the NBU had to use a range of urgent 
measures to recapitalize and nationalize banks. The 
Financial Sector Recovery Urgent Measures Act was 
drafted, granting the NBU exclusive rights to make 
appointments of the temporary administrators of the 
nationalized banks. In spite of clearly violating the rights 
of shareholders in governing banks through the 
supervisory board elections, this was a necessary 
procedure in view of the large number of bank failures 
and insolvencies.  Yet, since the National Bank of 
Ukraine was yet unprepared to implement the 
complicated capital adequacy requirements, it raised the 
minimal paid-in capital to USD 15-30 million. The act 
also required banks to cut administrative expenses and 
place a minimum of 50% of net profit in reserve funds. 
In sheer contrast, Egypt did not endure bank 
insolvencies due to the strict compliance with the capital 
requirements of Basel Accord II. However, in the absence 
of explicit customer deposit insurance, the CBE publicly 
declared that it will inexhaustibly guarantee customer 
deposits in all private and public Egyptian banks. This 
came in response to the rapid exodus of deposits from 
private to state-owned banks. Yet, the CBE sternly 
advised its banking units that it will not forfeit the 
minimum capital requirements and liquidity ratios. 
Perhaps the only exception was exempting Egyptian 
banks that lend small and microenterprises from the 14% 
legal reserve requirement (LRR). In addition, banks were 
allowed to hold 10% of the LRR in the form of T-Bills, 
which was merely an expansionary monetary policy tool.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
 
There is no doubt that in the case of a severe financial 
crisis the collective actions of both the monetary 
ROE 
Ukraine 
GDP 
Ukraine 
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authority by imposing regulatory controls and banks 
themselves through corporate governance (CG) is 
indispensible. While Basel Accord II is basically 
concerned with proper risk management, it merely 
viewed CG as the role of the Board of Directors (BOD). 
  
2.2.1 Corporate Governance in Ukrainian Banks 
 
National Bank of Ukraine enforces CG in accordance 
with the national legislation. There are three main 
legislative documents outlining the concepts and models 
of corporate governance, namely: the Civil Code of 
Ukraine, the Banks and Banking Act, and the Joint Stock 
Companies Act. All three documents complement one 
another with regard to the procedure of establishing the 
relationship between corporate governance bodies and the 
most powerful players, i.e. shareholders. Ukrainian banks 
use the monistic concept of corporate governance placing 
the key interests of shareholders at the forefront 
(Gourevitch, 2005). In the context of the existing 
legislation and practices, some different approaches to 
understanding the functions, powers or responsibilities of 
the Supervisory Board or Executive Board can be 
conjectured.  
It could be safely inferred that the model of 
corporate governance in Ukrainian banks is Continental 
(German) according to the functional purpose of the 
board of directors under which the supervisory board 
performs the role of “a controller” (Kwok and Tadesse, 
2006). Overall, Ukrainian banks use the two-tier board 
model, but in contrast to Germany, employees have no 
right to have a representative on the supervisory board 
(Licht et al., 2005). Moreover, Ukrainian minority 
shareholders have almost no ability to protect their own 
rights and interests. Another major concern that has to be 
immediately addressed by the various Ukrainian CG 
legislations pertains to the independence of the directors 
under the current board structure, since there are still no 
legislative requirements with regard to the share of 
independent directors on the supervisory board (Kostyuk 
et al., 2010).  
Whilst many developing countries have their own 
CG banking codes, Ukraine lacks its own. There was one 
meager attempt in 2007 to implement some sort of 
recommendations by the National Bank of Ukraine called 
“Guidelines for Improving Corporate Governance in 
Banks”, but these did not extend beyond being a set of 
scanty and highly contradictory recommendations. 
Hence, there is ample scope for future development and 
augmentation of CG in Ukrainian banks. In all 
probability, regulatory capital requirements and direct 
impacts on bank governance have concerned the NBU 
much more than corporate governance standards. A new 
decree was passed in July 2009, prohibiting loss-making 
banks from paying dividends to shareholders, bonuses 
and other material incentives to bank employees
2
. These 
measures were very much in line with international 
practices of cutting bonuses for managers and prohibiting 
bank loans to insiders. 
But the NBU has not paid adequate attention to the 
CG issues which could impact financial stability of 
banks. Thus, the independence of the members of the 
BOD has not been properly addressed. Moreover, the 
issue of the board committees has only been partly 
resolved in April 2009 when The Joint Stock Companies 
Act came into force and made it mandatory for every 
joint stock company including bank to establish an audit 
committee. Yet, no explicit reference has been made to 
other board committees which provide essential 
monitoring services to the bank, such as the nomination 
and remuneration of executives. The collective role of the 
market regulator, the audit committee and the supervisory 
boards are crucial to develop effective CG and risk 
management practices (Lys, 2009). Yet, the fact that both 
the state-owned and the recently nationalized banks are 
governed by temporary administrators appointed by the 
NBU conjures up this requirement. The lack of 
acceptable board committee practices in Ukraine reduces 
the role of supervisory boards to mere “rubber stamps”. 
Thus, the NBU regulatory measures conflict with the 
optimal global corporate governance practices.  
Another point that is worth close attention is the 
issue of executive compensation. Kostyuk (2003, 2005, 
2006) investigated board committee members’ 
remuneration in Ukrainian banks and concluded that there 
were very weak commotions by shareholders and 
supervisory board members in establishing the board 
committees. Similar to Ukraine, empirical evidence 
reveals the strong inclination of banks in transition 
economies to abide by the fixed salary of the board 
committee members with a link to the principle “pay for 
presence” as the remuneration disbursed for the 
attendance of the committee meetings by its members 
(Matoussi and Jardak, 2009). As a result, the issue of 
board committee members’ remuneration in transition 
economies is still beyond the scope of corporate 
governance in banks.  
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance in Egyptian Banks 
 
In spite of the fact that, unlike Ukraine, Egypt opened up 
to foreign capital in the mid-seventies, it instigated the 
corporate governance mechanisms only in the mid-1990s. 
It took the initiative in promoting and developing a 
corporate governance code as late as June 2004. The 
Egyptian Ministry of Investment issued in 2005 The 
Code of Corporate Governance for enterprises listed on 
the stock market (EMOI, 2006).
3
 Yet, this code is neither 
                                                   
2
 Decree of 22.07.2009 №421 “About Important Issues of Banking in 
Financial Crisis”. 
3 These rules are an addition to the Law on Shareholding Joint Stock 
Companies, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies issued by 
virtue of Law #159/1981; the Capital Market Law was issued by virtue 
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mandatory nor legally binding, but simply promotes 
responsible and transparent behavior in managing 
corporations to serve stakeholders’ interests (CIPE, 
2005). A second step was taken in 2006 where The Code 
of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector 
was issued, based on the report of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
working group on Privatization and Corporate 
Governance of State Owned Assets (Dahawy, 2009). The 
code introduces the principles of governing state-owned 
companies by presenting an organizational and legal 
framework for public companies.   
These codes and guidelines included many 
provisions, the objectives of which were to enhance the 
effectiveness of the boards of directors and to guarantee 
the rights of shareholders and various stakeholders. 
Similar to Ukraine, the concept of CG in Egypt is 
monistic (Azab, 2007). The BOD is unitary and 
comprises of executive and non-executive members. 
Moreover, various committees should be created, of 
which the Audit Committee is part of the internal 
auditing system. The code specifies that the BOD is 
determined according to capital distribution and is 
nominated to represent shareholders (Elsayed, 2010). The 
Bank Reform Plan (BRP) that was adopted in 2004 
enhanced CG through the adherence to the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance and Basel II 
requirements (Youssef, 2007). In a survey conducted in 
2006, Egyptian banks were performing well in regard to 
CG of risk management, but lacked board independence 
and objectivity as well as measurable standards defining 
the relationship between remuneration and performance 
in a manner that emphasizes the long run interests of the 
bank (EBI, 2006). 
However, a number of positive steps were taken 
lately to enhance corporate governance culture in Egypt. 
Firstly, the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIOD) was 
formed and mandated through different ministerial 
decrees and currently falls under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Investment, which is showering it with 
generous technical assistance and expertise. Second, the 
EIOD is working on designing CG training programs for 
all Egyptian companies, whether listed on the stock 
exchange or not. Thirdly, the guidelines for CG are now 
being widely spread through moral suasion and a CG 
index has been recently formulated. Moreover, different 
procedures are implemented to empower public 
companies’ management and enhance the role of the 
General Assemblies (GAs) to track and appraise 
management decisions. Most importantly, the first steps 
of implementation have been taken since a CG manual 
has been drafted. 
Conversely, EMEs that had a longer time horizon to 
benefit from gradual institutional evolution enjoy more 
mature CG norms. This is detailed in the Williamson 
institutional economics framework, which elucidates how 
                                                                                  
of Law #95/1992. 
economic growth and development are affected by the 
governance structure of firms, which in turn significantly 
relies on the legal framework and the level of 
development of both formal and informal institutions 
(Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Hence, the lack of 
sufficient CG practices in emerging economies such as 
Ukraine and Egypt addresses a lot of claims to central 
bankers and shareholders of banks. This delivers the 
critical importance of corporate governance amidst of the 
financial crisis and begs for instant reforms. 
 
Basel III 
 
According to the aforementioned information, it was only 
anticipated that the international community should rise 
to promptly reform the banking sector. This was executed 
through  
Basel III, which is the third materialization of the 
international agreement on bank capital rules.  Basel 
Accord I was first devised by the Basel Committee of 
Global Banking Regulators in 1988. Basel II was drafted 
by the end of 2006, but was not implemented in most 
countries till 2008.  It was often criticized on the premise 
that its capital requirements were inadequate and may 
result in frail banking systems (Benston, 2007). It was the 
events of the global financial crisis that overhauled Basel 
II as the BCBS persisted to provide bankers and 
regulators with guidelines for safe banking practices and 
corporate governance development. Three consultative 
documents were issued in 2010: Strengthening the 
Resilience of Banking System, International Framework 
for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring and Principles for Enhancing Corporate 
Governance. The said documents are currently 
consultative, yet some of the issues mentioned there 
should be highlighted in regard to new capital 
requirements, liquidity measures and corporate 
governance.  
The main concern is the possibility of a substantial 
decline in lending and investment levels, where banking 
practitioners are skeptical that the implementation of 
Basel III would cut economic growth over the next five 
years in the United States, the Euro Zone and Japan by 
3%, and shed 10 million jobs (IIF, 2010). In response, the 
Financial Stability Board challenges this assertion and 
demonstrates that every 1% increase in the capital ratio 
would cut the probability of crises in half, from 4.6% to 
2.3%, which translates into an annual GDP growth rate of 
1.4% (Cecchetti, 2010; FSB, 2010).  Given these two 
polar outcomes, it is imperative to conduct a thorough 
forecast. The following sections are devoted to building 
an econometric model to assess the impact of the 
impending reforms on each of Egypt and Ukraine. To this 
avail, it is vital to throw some light on the core 
amendments and reforms proposed by Basel III.  
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3.1 Capital Requirements 
 
Basel I and II did not guarantee the loss bearing capital 
outside insolvency. In many cases bank capital was 
inadequate and risky assets were introduced under the 
banner of innovative arbitrage. As capital was chipped off 
and balance sheets contracted in the wake of the GFC, the 
global community called for stringent regulatory controls 
to identify risks, challenge imprudent business models 
and take all necessary actions to preserve stability.
 Under Basel II banks must meet a minimum of 
4% of total risk-based assets as tier 1 capital and 8% tier 
1 and tier 2 capital. If a bank fails to comply, its 
supervisor can apply increasingly severe limits on its 
operations to the extent that the bank can even be 
liquidated if it remains critically undercapitalized. This 
arrangement is known as prompt corrective action, and 
aims to assure that failing banks are closed before they 
become insolvent.  Basel III imposes tighter stipulations 
since banks will have to hold a minimum core capital 
level of 4.5%.
4 
In addition, banks will be obliged to 
maintain a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to 
withstand future periods of stress, bringing the total 
common equity requirement to 7%. The BCBS gives a 
detailed definition of the leverage ratio, as specified in 
equation (1), but leaves it up to the national jurisdictions 
to identify a target level.  
However, many responses by the international 
financial community demand for a global harmonization 
of the leverage ratio (S&P, 2010). Although the total 
minimum capital requirement remains at 8%, the new 
buffer raises the effective capital requirement for banks to 
10.5%. Banks will be given a grace period up to 2015 to 
fully implement the new common equity and Tier 1 
capital requirements; up to 2019 to put the capital 
conservation buffer in place; and till 2023 to phase out 
hybrid securities that will no longer qualify as capital 
(BIS, 2010, a). 
 
Core capital
Leverage ratio=
On-balance-sheet assets+Off-balance-sheet assets (1) 
 
3.2 Liquidity Risk Coverage 
 
Basel II does not focus on liquidity requirements, hence 
there are currently 25 different liquidity measures 
globally used by supervisors. To achieve international 
harmony, the Committee developed a set of common 
metrics to monitor bank liquidity risk profiles. Basel III 
also outlines regulatory standards for liquidity risk to 
achieve two separate but complementary objectives. 
Equation (2) displays the first metric, which aims to 
promote short-term liquidity resilience of banks to cover 
contingent liquidity effects
5
. The Liquidity Coverage 
                                                   
4
 Banks are required to hold core capital in the form of common equity 
as it is the highest loss-absorbing capital. 
5
 High quality liquid assets are easily and immediately converted into 
cash at little or no loss of value. The definition has not been reached till 
Ratio (LCR) comprises of high quality liquid assets and 
net cash outflows calculated after conducting multiple 
acute stress scenarios for one month (BIS, 2010, b) 
 
Stock of high quality liquid assets
100
Net cash outflows over a 30-day time period
LCR   
(2) 
 
The second objective is building long-term resilience by 
funding bank activities with more stable sources on an 
ongoing basis. This is known as the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR), and is detailed in Equation (3). Available 
stable funding (ASF) is defined as the types and amounts 
of equity and liability financing that are reliable sources 
of funds over a one-year period under conditions of 
extended stress.
6
 While these two standards comprise of 
internationally harmonized parameters that use specific 
and concrete values, it is universally agreed that bank 
supervisors may use additional metrics in order to capture 
specific risks in their countries. 
 
Available amount of stable funding
NSFR 100
Required amount of stable funding
  
(3) 
 
3.3 Corporate Governance 
 
Finally, the BCBS has determined that the third pillar is 
the internal governance of banking firms, which will 
enable them to satisfy the public interest of financial 
stability. The committee has issued a consultative 
document that focuses on six coherent points (BCBS, 
2010, c):
7
  
 The responsibilities of the board of directors 
should be adequately exercised and effective 
oversight of senior management must be 
exercised to ensure the proper implementation of 
the bank’s business and risk strategy, 
organization, financial soundness and 
governance. 
  Senior management is held responsible for the 
extent of risk tolerance, overall bank strategy 
and polices of the board. 
 The appointment of a risk management 
department to act as an independent unit, albeit 
possessing necessary timely communication 
with the board. 
                                                                                  
the time that this paper was written, but this research will count the 
following as high quality liquid assets: cash; central bank reserves; and 
high quality 0% weighted-risk sovereign paper, high quality corporate 
bonds or covered bonds (receiving 20% or 40% haircut). The term 
high-quality includes assets with intact liquidity-generating capacity 
even in periods of severe idiosyncratic and market stress. 
6
 ASF is calculated as: capital; preferred stock with maturity of equal 
to or greater than one year; liabilities with maturity of equal to or 
greater than one year; and non-maturity deposits and term deposits with 
maturities of less than one year that are expected to stay with the 
institution for an extended period in an idiosyncratic stress event. 
7
 Basel III contends that additional CG requirements are not treated as 
imposing additional financial costs on banks.  
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 Board member and senior management 
remuneration has to be properly set forth 
according to national and Financial Stability 
Board guidelines (FSB, 2009). 
 The adoption of a transparent corporate structure 
by the board and the senior management. 
 Disclosure and transparency are the most 
important methods of a sound CG practice.  
A number of objections are directed to the impending 
guidelines. First, since there is extensive discussion of 
quantifying risks, one would have assumed that the 
submission and place of Chief Risk Officer (CRO) in the 
CG structure of banks would be accurately delineated. 
Yet, the document does not address the method of 
reporting and interaction between the CRO and the BOD. 
Another issue that is not thoroughly broached by the 
BCBS is that of executive remuneration. Thirdly, the 
document shows an attempt to connect risk taking and 
compensation, but has not distinctly defined the circle of 
employees who deserve the compensation whether these 
are the directors, the CEO or others. The range of 
possible risks is not clarified and this is apt to make some 
room for rule-bending. Also, there is dire need to develop 
governance scores to test the relation between corporate 
governance and bank efficiency (OECD, 2010).  
For the purpose of this research paper, Corporate 
Governance will be measured in accordance with the 
extent to which the BOD adopts and adheres to economic 
value alignment (EVA), which is based on the concept 
that a successful firm should earn at least its cost of 
capital. Earlier forms of CG imposition adopted measures 
similar to economic value added or value-based 
management, but recent studies reveal that EVA is more 
enriching since it measures the value added of overall 
costs, which is virtually the productivity of all factors of 
production (Lander and Reinstein 2005). Any deviation 
from the norms and standards calls for immediate 
corrective action. In other words, EVA aligns the 
expected value added concept to the entire management 
of the bank. It can be expressed as the following 
equation:  
 
EVA = Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) - 
(Capital x Cost of Capital)                      (4) 
 
NOPAT = Net Operating Profit - (Depreciation 
+ Implied Interest Expenses 
+ Opportunity Costs of Non-earning assets      (5) 
+ Opportunity Costs of Earning assets 
+ Goodwill Amortization) 
 
Adjustments made to operating earnings reflect the 
investments made by the banking firm or capital 
employed to achieve targeted profits. Since Basel III fails 
to set forth such yardsticks, the proposed proxy 
benchmarks that will be employed by this paper for EVA 
and NOPAT are calculated in accordance with banking 
units that barely abide by the new liquidity, leverage and 
capital ratios. The extra expenses of imposing EVA will 
be treated as an additional shock to the banking system 
and to the entire economy. This is further elucidated in 
section 7.  
Methodology 
 
In the last few decades the roles of macroeconomic 
models have extended to cover forecasting with the aim 
of designing reliable and sustainable policymaking 
modus operandi   (Meyer, 1997). 
Simultaneous-equations structural models have been 
habitually used to forecast the macroeconomic impact of 
specific variables. However, Cooley and LeRoy (1985) 
stipulate that such models are poorly suited to forecasting 
since future values are needed for the exogenous 
variables in the system. A better forecasting model is the 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model whose coefficients 
can be combinations of structural coefficients (Zellner, 
1979). But since both the standard econometric models 
and the VARs, are linear they fail to take account of the 
nonlinearities in the economy. It was for this reason that 
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models were developed since they are capable of 
handling both the possibilities of structural changes and 
the issues of nonlinearities (Christiano et al., 2005). 
Central banks commonly employ the DSGE model 
since it is flexible enough to include many 
macroeconomic variables or even to lump them up into 
categories (Edge et al., 2010). However, these models 
may be misspecified in some dimensions, undermining 
their forecasting performance (Del-Negro et al., 2005). 
This has tempted many economists to take combinations 
across many econometric models to hedge against such 
instabilities (Eklund and Karlsson, 2007; Clark and 
McCracken, 2010). However, Bache et al. (2009) 
combine a VAR model with a policymaking DSGE 
model by allowing for structural breaks in the VAR to 
reduce weight on the DSGE, and produce well-calibrated 
forecast densities. Also, recent studies (Smets and 
Wouters, 2007; Sims, 2008) suggest that advances in 
Bayesian estimation methods have made DSGE models 
capable of providing informative forecasts. 
 
4.1 DSGE Model 
 
This paper uses a small-scale DSGE model for Egypt and 
Ukraine to forecast the effects of the three proposed 
reforms of Basel III: capital requirements, liquidity ratios 
and corporate governance practices on real GDP growth, 
employment, inflation and interest rates. The study covers 
the period 2000:01-2010:03. The economy is divided into 
three agents: utility maximizing households, firms that 
seek to maximize profits, and monetary authorities with 
the explicit nominal anchor of price stability and the 
implicit goal of output growth and financial stability. The 
IS curve, the forward looking Phillips curve and the 
monetary policy rule further explain the model. The 
system is put to motion by structural demand, supply and 
The Second Annual Online International Conference on Corporate Governance & Regulation in Banks, 
Sumy, Ukraine, February 02 – February 04, 2011 
20 
 
monetary shocks.   
 
4.1.1 Households 
 
The model assumes that there are (i) households that 
aspire to maximize utility (Ut). Households decide on 
consumption expenditure (Ct) and saving instruments 
(St), which could be resold at the discount rate (1/Rt). 
The decision leads to the following dynamic IS-curve:  
 
1 1
1 1 1
i D i
t t t t t
t D
t t t t t
H R A H
U
A A A
 



 
 
  
        
        
          (6) 
 
where,  is a time-invariant discount factor. The 
individual household habit 
i
tH  is adjusted for the 
growth rate of technology gt. Present consumption Ct is a 
fraction of past consumption Ct-1.   
 
1(1 )
i i
t t t tH C g C                        (7) 
 
At is a deterministic trend in technology, such that  
 
ln t tA g                                   (8) 
 
D
t is a demand shock affecting the household’s 
decisions of the levels of consumption and savings. It 
follows an AR(1) process with 
D
t being an i.i.d. white 
noise disturbance as follows: 
 
 
  11D D D D D Dt t t       
                (9) 
 
and t is the change in the inflation measured by the 
consumer price index (CPI), 
 
t t-1
t-1
CPI CPI
CPI
t

 
                        (10) 
 
The following is the labour supply curve: 
 
 
i
it t
L t
t t t
W H
L
PA A



 
  
                     (11) 
 
 
4.1.2 Firms 
 
The model is assumed to operate with monopolistically 
competitive (j) firms of mass 1 producing differentiated 
intermediate goods (
j
tY ) and firms producing final goods 
(Yt);  >1 is the elasticity of substitution between the 
goods. 
 
1 1 1
0
( )jt tY Y dj

 

  
  
 

                      (12) 
 
Producers of final goods minimize costs, but take the 
price of intermediate goods as given. The consumer price 
of the final product is denoted as: 
 
1
1
1
1
0
( )jt tP P dj




 
  
 

                        (13)  
 
Firms face a downward sloping demand curve, i.e. 
quantity demanded of (j) is inverse to price. 
 
j
j t
t t
t
P
Y Y
P

 
  
                          (14) 
 
The expected discounted profit (
j
t ) for a firm that can 
re-optimize its price is given by: 
 
  
j
j j N t t t
t t t t
t
P PY
P MC Y
P




   
     
       (15) 
 
where, the nominal marginal cost (
N
tMC ) per unit is 
given by: 
 
N t
t s
t t
W
MC
A

                              (16) 
 
and  
j s j t
t t t t
Y
Y A L

 
                          (17) 
 
The supply shock  
 
  11s s s s s st t t       
             (18) 
 
and
s
t  is an i.d.d. white noise disturbance.  
Staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) is assumed 
where (ξ) denotes the probability that the firm is unable 
to set its own prices and the price is automatically 
adjusted by a steady inflation rate () . The implied price 
The Second Annual Online International Conference on Corporate Governance & Regulation in Banks, 
Sumy, Ukraine, February 02 – February 04, 2011 
21 
 
duration is 1/1- ξ. Accordingly, firms that cannot 
optimize their price follow the following indexation rule:  
 
_
1
_
1
s
j j t s
t s t
s
t
P
P P
P

 


 
                         (19) 
 
Conversely, banks that are able to re-optimize their price 
and to maximize the present value of their discounted 
profits in period t operate according to the following rule: 
 
,
0
max
j
t
j s j
t t t s t s
P
s
Q  

 

 
 
 

              (20) 
 
where, ,t t s
Q  is a time-dependent stochastic discount 
factor.  
Substituting (19) and (20) in (15) yields the following:
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Accordingly, the expected discounted profit yields: 
_
1
,
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where, 
j
tP

is the security price that maximizes the value 
of its future returns. Households are owners of the bank 
and receive capital gains and profits, and hence they 
make their decisions based on both current and future 
expectations of marginal costs. The following is the price 
level:  
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
(23)  
  
4.1.3 Central Bank 
 
As mentioned earlier, the nominal anchor of both the 
NBU and the CBE is inflation targeting, while the 
implicit targets are GDP growth and financial stability. 
Again, the higher costs of production are simulated for 
the period of the study and the monetary agents are 
expected to use the overnight interest rate as the 
operational target to offset the effects of these higher 
costs that are apt to affect both the implicit and explicit 
targets. In accordance with Rudebusch (2002) interest 
rate smoothing () is introduced into the monetary policy 
reaction function.  
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                      (24) 
 
where, 
M
is an i.d.d. white noise disturbance. 
The market clearing condition for the domestic economy 
requires that: 
 
f
t t tY C C                                 (25) 
 
where, the left-hand-side is the supply of domestic goods 
and the right-hand-side comprises of domestic demand 
(Ct) and export demand from the rest of the world(
f
tC ).  
 
f
j
f ft
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C Y
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
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and, ( ) represents the share of foreign imports to total 
foreign output. 
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Results  
 
Table (1) reports the DSGE parameter estimates for prior 
and recursive posterior distributions. Parameters are 
estimated with a1 and up to 4 lag length, and with a rather 
tight prior distribution for a grid of values: {0.67, 0.8, 
1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 10, 100}. Also, in accordance with 
Justiniano and Preston (2008) the model is estimated 
without accounting for misspecification. The value of the 
discount factor () was calibrated at 0.995 as per Hansen 
(1985). While habit formation plays a very small role, 
inflation indexation is quite prominent, which is in 
accordance with Christiano et al. (2005). The parameter 
for price stickiness takes a particularly high value, which 
means that prices adjust quite sluggishly. These findings 
regarding prices are especially important due to the 
stubborn inflation in both countries. The supply shock 
persistence is higher than that for demand. 
   
 
Table 1 Structural Parameters 
 
 Prior Distribution Recursive Mode of Posterior 
Mean SD Median Mean Min. Max. 
Discount factor () 0.995      
Habit formation (H) 0.49 0.10 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.64 
Labour supply elasticity () 1.68 0.67 1.45 1.5 1.41 1.62 
Elasticity of substitution () 0.98 0.41 0.69 0.68 0.55 1.21 
Calvo prices () 0.84 0.19 0.69 0.69 0.51 0.65 
Inflation indexation () 0.83 0.15 0.37 0.38 0.30 0.45 
Int. rate smoothing () 0.79 0.19 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.71 
Inflation response () 1.71 0.41 1.65 1.78 1.58 1.71 
GDP growth response (y) 0.29 0.1 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Demand shock persistenceD 0.78 0.1 0.61 0.6 0.56 0.64 
Supply shock persistenceS 0.88 0.09 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.99 
Supply shock SD (S) 0.41 2 0.81 1.08 1.07 1.25 
Demand shock (D)  0.22 2 0.85 1.34 1.22 1.97 
Monetary shock (M)  0.12 2 0.09 1.17 1.11 1.79 
Beta distribution 
Normal distribution 
 Inverse gamma distribution  
 
The stylized facts of the data are compared to the 
baseline model in Table (2). The baseline model properly 
emulates most of the stylized facts. There are two 
noticeable problems, the first is that the baseline model 
underestimates the variability of inflation for both 
nations; the standard deviation (SD) of inflation is 3.33% 
in the baseline model, while it amounts to 10.11% for 
Egypt and 9.03% for Ukraine. Secondly, the model 
underestimates the variability of the interest rate. Also, in 
regard to the interest rate, the model records 97% 
correlation with output, in comparison to 11% for Egypt 
and only 1% for Ukraine. All other results appear to be 
consistent with previous research. For example, output is 
more variable than consumption. Moreover, the high 
volatility of investment in relation to output is in line with 
the previous literature, since there are more important 
determining factors of investment such as contagion 
effects of financial crises, foreign direct investment, 
interest rates and financial stability (Moguillansky 2002).  
 
Table 2 Baseline Model and Actual Data 
 
 Baseline Model Egypt Ukraine 
 SD SD/GDP Corr. SD SD/GDP Corr. SD SD/GDP Corr. 
GDP 2.22 1.00 1.00 2.27 1.00 1.00 1.98 1.00 1.00 
Inflation 3.33 4.29 0.91 10.11 6.71 0.88 9.03 5.34 0.69 
Employment 1.21 0.78 0.99 1.39 0.76 0.81 1.92 0.71 0.55 
Consumption 0.77 0.39 0.81 0.83 0.45 0.74 0.79 0.50 0.46 
Investment 7.41 5.12 0.97 8.31 4.82 0.95 9.72 3.89 0.71 
Interest rate 0.09 0.1 0.97 1.39 1.56 0.11 2.34 2.61 0.01 
 
The impulse response functions are displayed by 
Figures (2) and (3) for demand, supply and monetary 
shocks for both nations. While monetary policy appears 
to have played a role in inflation and disinflation, a 
negative demand shocks contributes to low inflation. But 
demand and productivity shocks have only limited effects 
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on the price level. This is mainly due to the fact that both 
the CBE and the NBU respond rather immediately to 
output gaps and their resulting impact on inflation. The 
DSGE model is able to replicate both the negative 
correlation between inflation one to two years in the past 
and current output and the positive correlation between 
current output and inflation one year ahead. Moreover, a 
positive productivity shock leads to an expansion of 
aggregate demand and output. The monetary policy 
reaction function shows a fall in interest rates, but not 
enough to prevent the opening up of an output gap and a 
fall in inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Shocks (Egypt) 
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses to Shocks (Ukraine) 
 
 
Forecasts using the BVAR Model 
  
The out-of-sample forecasting performance of the DSGE 
model could be tested by using the Bayesian VAR in 
terms of the Mean Absolute Percentage Errors (MAPEs). 
This means that the coefficients are assumed to have a 
prior distribution, which implies that after applying the 
data the coefficients will get posterior distribution.    
0 1( )t t tL                             (27) 
where, 0 is an (nx1) vector of constants, t

is an (nx1) 
vector of variables that are to be forecasted, t

 is an 
(nx1) vector of while-noise error terms. 
2 3
1 11 12 13 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ..... ( )
n
nL L L L L         (28) 
The forecasts of the VAR model have been 
widely criticized for the inclusion of too many variables 
and lags, many of which may be insignificant. The 
multi-collinearity and the loss of degrees of freedom lead 
to inefficient estimates and a rapid deterioration of 
forecasts as the time horizon becomes longer. Bayesian 
techniques can overcome this problem by imposing 
restrictions for all coefficients with decreasing standard 
deviations (SD) as lags increase.  This could be done by 
specifying Minnesota prior distributions with zero means 
and standard deviations (Litterman, 1986). 8  The 
one-to-eight period ahead forecasts are performed for the 
period 2000:01-2010:03. In accordance with Lesage 
(1999), the pertinent hyper-parameters for overall 
tightness (w) are set at 0.2, 0.1 for the harmonic lag decay 
(d) of 1 and 2. Furthermore, following Dua and Ray 
(1995) w=0.3 and d=0.5 is also measured. All variables 
are in logs, except for inflation and interest rates. Tables 
(3) through (6) summarize the MAPEs for the DSGE and 
the BVAR for GDP, employment, inflation and interest 
                                                   
8
 The only exception is the mean of the first own lag is equal to unity 
since it is assumed that own lags account for most of the variation of the 
variable.  
rates.  
The BVAR model outperforms the DSGE model 
in terms of MAPE estimates. The best estimates are given 
by the loosest prior (w = 0.3, d = 0.5) for interest rates 
and employment; by the slightly tighter prior (w = 0.1, d 
= 1) for GDP and inflation. In other words, better 
estimates are provided by the looser rather than the 
tighter priors. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Dua and Ray (1995). 
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Table 3 MAPEs for GDP in Logs (2000:01-2010:03) 
 
Quarter Ahead DSGE BVAR 
w =0.3,d=0.5 w=0.2,d=1 w=0.2,d=2 w=0.1,d=1 w=0.1,d=2 
1 6.9912 0.00002 0.00004 0.00039 0.00023 0.00041 
2 6.8191 0.00121 0.00434 0.00491 0.00398 0.00589 
3 7.4132 0.00344 0.00219 0.00419 0.00329 0.00298 
4 7.1129 0.00511 0.00478 0.00391 0.00026 0.00410 
5 7.3210 0.00491 0.00593 0.00388 0.00173 0.00561 
6 6.8923 0.00397 0.48321 0.00099 0.00234 0.00311 
7 7.5612 0.00010 0.00290 0.00417 0.00316 0.00298 
8 7.8931 0.00101 0.00832 0.00421 0.00391 0.00341 
 
Table 4 MAPEs for Employment in Logs (2000:01-2010:03) 
 
Quarter Ahead DSGE BVAR 
w =0.3,d=0.5 w=0.2,d=1 w=0.2,d=2 w=0.1,d=1 w=0.1,d=2 
1 36.0212 0.00223 0.00134 0.00149 0.00122 0.00378 
2 34.2101 0.00621 0.00194 0.00301 0.00321 0.00391 
3 37.0041 0.00444 0.00259 0.00281 0.00289 0.00429 
4 37.1921 0.00591 0.00691 0.00323 0.00344 0.00512 
5 36.1211 0.00547 0.00521 0.00298 0.00128 0.00529 
6 36.1523 0.00303 0.00631 0.00641 0.00381 0.00582 
7 32.7812 0.00561 0.00811 0.00678 0.00512 0.00599 
8 34. 5611 0.00001 0.00889 0.00789 0.00412 0.00628 
 
Table 5 MAPEs for Inflation (2000:01-2010:03) 
 
Quarter Ahead DSGE BVAR 
w =0.3,d=0.5 w=0.2,d=1 w=0.2,d=2 w=0.1,d=1 w=0.1,d=2 
1 34.2314 0.03512 0.03891 0.03834 0.03956 0.03867 
2 32.1278 0.06378 0.03487 0.03278 0.04001 0.03856 
3 28.1325 0.04541 0.02987 0.03653 0.04213 0.03978 
4 27.1229 0.01280 0.03348 0.03818 0.04389 0.04356 
5 27.3261 0.05617 0.03712 0.03967 0.05123 0.04778 
6 26.23667 0.03873 0.03845 0.04389 0.06578 0.04987 
7 27.0112 0.02313 0.04923 0.05612 0.07534 0.05128 
8 27.1912 0.05482 0.05561 0.06978 0.07612 0.06778 
 
Table 6 MAPEs for Interest Rates (2000:01-2010:03) 
 
Quarter Ahead DSGE BVAR 
w =0.3,d=0.5 w=0.2,d=1 w=0.2,d=2 w=0.1,d=1 w=0.1,d=2 
1 40. 2342 0. 24325 0.30010 0.21389 0.44233 0.00041 
2 46. 9101 0.43561 0. 38934 0.34488 0.43198 0. 43589 
3 47. 2234 0. 49234 0. 44519 0.44190 0. 41329 0.34198 
4 41.5639 0. 51001 0.46719 0.43491 0.44910 0.39101 
5 47.3110 0. 49111 0.42978 0.45698 0.41397 0.41291 
6 56.4523 0. 30097 0.45198 0.47189 0.49311 0.54221 
7 42. 1006 0.32910 0.62289 0.45121 0.42440 0.34129 
8 45.4421 0.31101 0.71534 0.78194 0.32001 0.39867 
 
 
Policy Experiments and Ex Ante Growth 
Impacts 
 
The next step is to impose the proposed regulatory 
reforms as an additional shock to the balance sheet of the 
banking sectors of both nations.  Due to the new 
requirements, banks will pass on this constriction of their 
profit margins to borrowers. As the bank credit supply to 
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the private sector is reduced, real GDP growth and 
employment are apt to be affected. It is true that credit is 
available through other formal and informal financial 
channels, but it must be mentioned that in nations where 
the banking sector accounts for more than 75% of lending, 
like Ukraine and Egypt, nominal GDP growth is 
supported by nominal credit growth.  
Basel III allows banks till 2015 to meet the new 
common equity and Tier 1 capital requirements, and till 
2019 to meet the capital conservation buffer requirements. 
Hence, the rise in the real lending rate charged to the 
private sector due to the regulatory changes will peak in 
2013-14 and 2017-18. These are the two periods where 
both GDP and employment are projected to be severely 
affected. As households and firms react to the rise in 
borrowing rates, monetary authorities are also expected to 
intervene through credit and liquidity easing. The 
reactions are displayed in the form of demand, supply and 
monetary shocks. Thus, it is imperative to calculate the ex 
ante growth impacts where a number of regulatory 
changes are imposed. In this regard, nominal GDP growth 
is highly dependent on bank credit growth to businesses 
and households, as well as to credit growth from other 
sources. The path of nominal GDP (GDPn) growth is 
deflated to produce a path for real GDP (GDPr) growth as 
follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 0B NB InfCR CR CR CR e            (29) 
 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1B cons res comm cons ind agr servCR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR e                            (30) 
 
21 22 23 2NB SE INS otherCR CR CR CR e       (31) 
 
n
n
GDP CR
f dx
GDP CR
  
  
  , where ƒ′ > 0         (32) 
 
Figure (4) shows the three types of shocks, while 
Figure (5) elucidates that the largest GDP impacts are 
reported during the periods of meeting the capital buffer 
requirements and the CG stipulations in accordance with 
the measurement techniques that were previously 
clarified in section 3.3. But the drag fades notably over 
time and Ukraine appears to be most vulnerable to the 
impact of regulatory reform. Intuitively, this should not 
be too surprising, since Ukraine is more geared to debt 
rather than equity financing. However, it should be 
mentioned at this point that this is only a reduced form 
approach of macroeconomic modeling. 
 
Figure 4. Forecasts of Shocks 
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Kalman smoother estimate conditional on posterior mean of parameters; shaded areas represent the interval between the 
5th and 95th percentiles 
Figure 5. GDP Forecast 
 
Future Research and Recommendations  
 
This paper attempted to study the costs of conforming to 
Basel III for Egypt and Ukraine when macroeconomic 
performance is appraised in terms of output growth, 
stabilizing prices and job creation. The DSGE model was 
utilized to forecast the expected impact of the adoption of 
Basel III requirements of capital adequacy, liquidity 
constraints and CG in both nations. The study used 
historical real-time data to explore the effects of demand, 
supply and monetary shocks on the set of macroeconomic 
variables. The DSGE calibrations were further tested 
using the BVAR model. The results reveal that the BVAR 
model produces more accurate forecasts than the DSGE 
model, rendering the latter an inaccurate forecasting tool 
for both nations. Then the estimated model was used for 
the policy experiment of imposing the Basel III 
restrictions. A subset in the DSGE model was employed 
as policy parameters to allow their values to be chosen. 
Both the DSGE and the BVAR models were re-simulated 
and output growth was re-evaluated.  
The results reveal that the collective impacts of 
meeting capital adequacy, liquidity and corporate 
governance requirements are better weathered by the 
Egyptian economy. Ukrainian GDP shows a slowdown 
throughout the period 2013-18, after which recovery is 
realized. This is a very important result that shows that 
the vigilance of Egyptian supervisory agents was a 
pertinent source of enhancing and sustaining 
macroeconomic performance.  Also, the costs of the 
proposed regulatory reforms will be quite detrimental for 
Ukraine, but are forecasted to be better sustained by the 
Egyptian economy, implying that emerging nations that 
were well geared up through meeting Basel II 
requirements will show more resilience to the costliness 
of future reforms. The general recommendation to 
enhance the resilience of the Ukrainian banking sector is 
to expedite bank regulatory reforms and complement 
them with proper corporate governance practices. 
Probably, the most problematic issue in that way is the 
lack of detailed and well-understood standards of 
corporate governance in banks introduced by legislation 
and the National Bank of Ukraine. Ukraine reports the 
lack of requirements and even guidelines in such issues as 
the directors’ independence, board committees’ system, a 
link of executive remuneration to the risks of the banks 
and other issues allowing the risk management and 
control system in banks to operate effectively. Also, 
Ukraine lacks an independent structure that is responsible 
for initiating all those reforms like Institute of 
Independent Directors in Egypt in 2005. Since it is 
overwhelmed with an array of regulatory duties, the 
National Bank of Ukraine has fallen short of attaining the 
appropriate degree of competence in introducing the 
advanced corporate governance standards for banks. 
Some other policy implications can be induced from 
the results. Firstly, since the DSGE model proved to be an 
inaccurate forecasting tool, the CBE ought to replace it 
with a more reliable model. Moreover, given the high 
levels of vulnerability and macroeconomic instability in 
Ukraine, it is recommended that the NBU should start 
employing a suitable forecasting tool. Given the success 
of other emerging economies in using the DSGE-VAR 
model, future research must be geared towards testing its 
efficacy as an alternative forecasting tool.   
Secondly, this study opens the door to more 
exhaustive research in order to better assess the overall 
macroeconomic impacts and costs of the impending Basel 
III. Some of the variables that were exogenously set need 
to be calibrated and made endogenous to allow feedback 
mechanisms and interactions to develop. For example, 
while the expected monetary shock and the changes in the 
policy rate were examined, the forecasted changes and 
interactions of the government bond yield were ignored. 
Also, given the relative levels of immaturity of financial 
markets in EMEs, the informal non-bank credit channels 
need to be examined in more detail.  
Thirdly, future research has to carefully study the 
behavior of banks in reaction to liquidity requirements. 
For example, banks may reduce the maturities of loans 
that they grant to corporations and direct loans to sectors 
that do not trigger economic growth.  More studies need 
to be conducted especially after the elapse of the 
observation period for the liquidity coverage ratio, which 
extends from 2011 to 2014, and the net stable funding 
ratio that will be imposed in 2018. 
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Furthermore, this research may have taken account 
of the estimated costs of the reforms, but it has totally 
ignored the expected benefits of introducing financial 
stability. Amongst these benefits are enhanced national 
savings and investment expenditure as well as avoiding 
the usage of public funds to finance unconventional tools 
of monetary policy. If these are taken into consideration, 
the capital buffers, liquidity requirements and internal 
corporate governance costs may be found to be loss 
bearing in the long run.  
Finally, the proposed new institutional and 
regulatory framework has limited the role of monetary 
authorities to a judgment-focused approach including a 
micro and macro prudential view, stress testing and the 
use of recovery and resolution planning. Yet, it is also 
important to assess the implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy and the demand for central bank 
refinancing, which may affect monetary transmission 
mechanisms. 
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